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Priority No. 11

:

THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL
JOURNALISTS, UTAH CHAPTER, and
THE DESERET NEWS PUBLISHING
COMPANY,

t
:

Intervenors and
Appellants•

:

RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the media failed to

satisfy the two-part test in Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) r"Press Enterprise II" 1 for extending a
First Amendment presumptive right of public access to any pretrial
documents filed in a court, including those filed in conjunction
with warrant and subpoena issuance?
2.

Did the media waive any claim that, under a separate test, the

Utah Constitution creates a presumptive right of public access to
such documents, even if the federal constitution does not, by
failing to raise this issue in the trial court? In any event, have
the media failed to demonstrate a basis for recognizing a separate
state constitutional presumptive right of public access to any
1

pretrial documents filed in a court, including those filed in
conjunction with warrant or subpoena issuance?
3.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the media failed to

establish any Utah common law right of public access to pretrial
documents filed in a court, including those filed in conjunction
with warrant or subpoena issuance? Regardless of whether the trial
court was correct on this point, was any such right superseded via
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1986) by the statutory right of public
access to judicial records and other public writings in the nowrepealed Public and Private Writings Act and the Archives and
Records Services Act?
4.

Did the media

adequately present

for the trial court's

determination the issue of whether the common law of Utah, the
first amendment of the United States Constitution, or article I,
section

15 of

the

Utah

Constitution

presumptively

guarantee

physical access by the public, before trial, to inspect and copy
all exhibits admitted into evidence at a preliminary hearing?
5.

Have the media established an adequate basis for extending a

separate constitutional right of physical access by the public, for
inspection and copying before trial, to all exhibits admitted into
evidence at a preliminary hearing?
6.

Is there a common law right in Utah of physical access by the

public, for inspection and copying before trial, to all exhibits
admitted into evidence at a preliminary hearing? Is any such right
supplanted by the Utah statutes governing public access to, and
copying of, judicial records as public records?
2

These issues present questions of law only, on which the trial
court's rulings are reviewed for correctness•

Standard Fed.

Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
In this appeal, the media seek two broadly framed extensions of
current constitutional law and common law far beyond the factual
circumstances presented by this case and far beyond the legal
questions actually posed to, and decided by, the trial court.
These

criminal

cases

arise

from

a particularly

gruesome

homicide in southern Utah on November 22, 1988, involving sexual
assault, kidnapping, and torture of twenty-eight-year-old Gordon
Church of Delta, Utah.

Among other things, Church had been bound

and gagged, chained, had battery cables attached to his genitals,
was repeatedly beaten, had his skin pierced, was anally raped and
impaled twice with an 18" tire iron, and subsequently had his skull
shattered and brain pulpified with repeated blows from the tire
iron

and

various

parts

of

a

car

jack

(Preliminary

Hearing

Transcript at 77-139).
The justice court sealed its own case file on November 25, 1988
(R.

3-4), based

on

the

State's

motion

that

day

(R.

1-2)

representing that closure was then necessary to protect the ongoing
criminal investigation. The file contained the following pretrial
documents: probable cause affidavits for the arrests of defendants
Archuleta and Wood, executed by Deputy Millard County Attorney
Dexter Anderson on November 24, 1988, and November 25, 1988,
respectively (R. 1297-1300; R. 1301-1305); affidavit for search
3

warrant of Archuleta's girlfriend's apartment (R„ 1312-13); and
affidavit for search warrant of the person of defendant Archuleta
(R. 1316-1323).

These documents contained detailed but partially

conflicting information about the conduct of the crimes, obtained
from separate police interviews with defendants Wood and Archuleta.
Each defendant had identified the other as the prime actor in the
atrocities, to which each claimed to have been an unwitting
spectator.
On December 15, 1988, the media filed a motion to intervene in
the criminal cases for the purpose of challenging the closure of
the justice court files (R. 65). In their supporting memoranda,
the media claimed that, under the federal and state constitutions,
the presumption

of openness of criminal preliminary hearings

recognized in Press Enterprise II and Kearns-Tribune Corp. v.
Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984), should be extended to any document
once filed in any court (R. 13-14, 76-77).

Based on this premise,

the media asserted that the sealing of any court record in a
criminal case was not constitutionally permissible until after
notice to the media and a hearing, at which the media were present
and at which the proponent of closure of the court file was able to
prevail under the balancing test set out in Kearns-Tribune and
Press Enterprise II for closure of a preliminary hearing to protect
a defendant's

sixth amendment

right to a fair trial and an

impartial jury (R. 14-16, 78).
On January 24, 1989, Magistrate Hare granted intervention but,
over the media's objection, granted defendants' motion to close
4

their joint preliminary hearing, which began that day, in order to
protect their rights to a fair trial and impartial jury (Transcript
of Preliminary Hearing, Vol. I at 50-51; R. 118-120).

He also

ordered that documents in the justice court file containing any
evidence, including the probable cause statements and affidavits
for search warrants, remain sealed

(Transcript of Preliminary

Hearing, Vol. I at 52). Other documents in the file at that time
that did not contain such evidence were to be open to public
inspection

(Ld.).

The

magistrate

subsequently

refused

to

reconsider these rulings (R. 121).*
At the closed, joint preliminary hearing of defendants
Archuleta and Wood, the magistrate received into evidence the
following exhibits (Supplemental Record Item B, R. 1535-1538):
Exhibit 1: Certified copy of 11/24/88 Autopsy report by
Dr. Sharon Schnittker.
Exhibit 2:
Nine diagrams prepared by Dr. Schnittker
showing damage inflicted on various sections of Gordon Ray
Church's body, three of front of body, one of back, one of
entire body, one of head (anterior and posterior views),
two of head (lateral views), one of base of skull (inferior
and superior views) one of brain (inferior, superior, and
lateral views).
Exhibit 3: Fluid and tissue samples (blood, pubic hair,
scalp hair, arm pit hair) taken from Gordon Ray Church body
during autopsy for testing at Crime Lab.
Exhibit 4: Tire iron with hexagonal wrench on the end.
Exhibits 5f 6: Leg and ratchet section of car jack.
Exhibits 7-9: Battery cables and clamp.
Exhibit 10: Wire cutters.
Exhibits 11, 12: Photographs of victim's father's car.
Exhibit 13: Base of car jack.
Exhibits 14, 15: Tire chains.
Exhibits 16, 17: Bungie cords.
x

The media then filed a separate action in District Court
against the magistrate, seeking relief from the closure of the
court file and the preliminary hearing by way of mandamus. No
ruling was ever obtained in that action.

5

Exhibit 18: Wire cutters.
Exhibit 19: Fishing tackle box used as tool box by victim.
Exhibit 20: Photograph of open trunk of car owned by
victim's father.
Exhibit 20: Photograph of victim working at K-Mart.
Exhibit 22: Enlargement of Ex. 21 showing victim's wrist.
Exhibits 23, 24: Victim's wristwatch and watch box.
Exhibits 25, 26: Victim's pants and suede coat.
Exhibits 27: Defendant Archuleta's levis.
Exhibit 28: Knife blade.
Exhibit 29: Defendant Wood's pants.
Exhibits 34, 35: Hair sample and bone fragment.
Exhibit 36: Dirt sample containing human blood.
Exhibit 37: Photograph of gag removed from victim's mouth
at autopsy.
Exhibits 43, 46: Latent fingerprint cards from car driven
by victim.
Exhibits 44, 45:
Ten-print fingerprint card and palm
impression taken from Defendant Wood.
Exhibits 48, 50: Two lamps and fan taken from trunk of car
driven by victim.
Exhibit 49: Bumper sticker from bumper of car driven by
victim.
Exhibit 53: Green folder.
Exhibits 54, 55, 56: Diagrams by witness of where she saw
victim and Defendant Archuleta.
Exhibit 57: Diagram by Paula Sue Jones of hear apartment.
Exhibits 60, 60a: Transcript of Archuleta interview of
11/24-25/88; audiotape of same.
Exhibits 61, 61a: Transcript of Archuleta interview of
11/27/88; audiotape of same.
Exhibits 62, 62a: Transcript of Archuleta interview of
12/2/88; audiotape of same.
Exhibits 63, 63a:
Transcript of Wood
interview of
11/26/88; audiotape of same.
The tapes and transcripts of the defendants' inculpatory
statements to police during lengthy interviews (Exs. 60, 60a, 61,
61a, 62, 62a, 63, 63a) were not played or read into the record at
the preliminary hearing.

Instead, they were simply received in

evidence for purposes of the magistrate's bindover determination
(Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Vol. Ill at 771, 783).

For

this reason, Magistrate Hare kept the interview transcripts,
retaining them in the justice court file so he could read them
6

after the hearing (Id. at 832). Exhibit 25, the victim's stained
pants, were returned to the State Crime Lab for further testing of
the stains on them for blood (Id.).

The other exhibits admitted

into evidence were returned to the secure storage facility at the
Millard County Sheriff's Office.

(.Id. at 784, 830).

Magistrate Hare's April 5, 1989, bindover order directed that
the seal on the justice court file continue and ordered the
transcripts of the preliminary hearing sealed (R. 496).
obtaining

jurisdiction

After

over the two separate criminal cases,

District Court Judges George Ballif and Boyd Park ordered both
seals continued on May 25, 1989, in the two cases (R. 497, 504).
Two weeks later, the media filed a motion as intervenors to unseal
the

justice

court

files and release

the transcripts

of the

preliminary hearing (R. 506-07).
In arguing for removal of the district court's seal on the
justice court file, the media once again broadly claimed: (1) The
public has a presumptive constitutional right of access to all
pretrial documents once they are filed in any court under the tests
enunciated in Press Enterprise II and Reams-Tribune for when the
first amendment and state constitutional right of public access
should be extended to pretrial criminal proceedings.

(2) Once a

constitutional right of access is held to extend to pretrial court
documents, the presumption is that they are open to the public.
These documents could be sealed, the media asserted, only if there
were prior notice to the media of the proposed seal and a hearing
before sealing that resulted in findings Kearns-Tribune and Press

7

Enterprise

II made prerequisite to closure of a preliminary

hearing.

(Transcript

of

Hearing

July

21,

1989, at

53-54;

Memorandum, R. 142-144, 147-152; Supplemental Statement, R. 596600).

The State countered that the first premise had not been

established, i.e., the media had failed to satisfy either of the
two prongs of the Press-Enterprise II test by showing that (a)
historical

experience

counseled

in

favor

of

finding

a

constitutional right of access here, and (b) public access would
play a

significant

positive role in the

functioning

of the

particular process in question. Therefore, there was no basis for
holding that there is a constitutionally created right of public
access

to,

and

concomitant

presumption

of

openness

of, the

particular pretrial documents under seal here, probable cause
statements and affidavits in support of warrants

(Supplemental

Statement, R. 634-35, 639-42).
With regard to the issue of access to the transcripts of the
preliminary hearing, Judges Ballif and Park recognized the public's
presumptive right of access to a preliminary hearing and thus to
the transcripts of the preliminary hearing in this case (R. 52627).2

Accordingly, the two judges held an evidentiary hearing on

September 7, 1989, of the type required by Reams -Tribune and Press
Enterprise II. in order to weigh the media's presumed right of
access

to

the

preliminary

hearing

2

transcripts

against

the

The public is entitled to a transcript of the closed portions
of a preliminary hearing at the earliest time consistent with the
countervailing interests that necessitated closure.
KearnsTribune, 685 P.2d at 524.
8

defendants' rights to a fair and impartial jury (R. 526-27).

The

State's position, and that of both defendants, was that release of
the preliminary hearing transcripts would, due to the grotesque
nature of the torture, object rape, and killing of the victim,
inflame members of the small local community where the case was to
be tried, making it impossible to select an impartial jury at
Archuleta's trial, then scheduled to begin on October 10, 1989
(Transcript of Hearing of September 11, 1989 at 18-22, 69).
In their October 23, 1989, ruling (R. 943-945), Judges Park and
Ballif granted the media's motion to release the preliminary
hearing transcripts, thereby granting the media access "to those
matters they could have reported had the Court been open and the
Media representatives permitted to attend." (R. 944). However, the
court declined to unseal the "pretrial documents" in the justice
court file (R. 944).
explained

In their memorandum decision, the judges

that release of some of the evidence received via

witnesses and exhibits at the preliminary hearings (ultimately
enumerated in Finding of Fact 18 at R. 1066-68) would create a
realistic likelihood of prejudice to defendants' fair trial rights
but that, under the standards set out in Kearns-Tribune and Press
Enterprise II, there were other procedures available to them,
particularly change of venue3 and jury voir dire, that reduced the
likelihood of prejudice to a point consistent with release of the
3

In the same order, the court transferred venue from Millard
County to Utah County.
Both defendants were subsequently
convicted, and their appeals are currently pending before this
Court in State v. Archuleta, Supreme Court No. 900041, and State v.
Wood, Supreme Court No. 900194.
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preliminary hearing transcripts (R. 950-56).
With respect to the seal on the justice court file, the judges
explained that the "pretrial documents" for which they were denying
the media's claimed First Amendment presumptive right of public
access included "probable cause statements, affidavits in support
of search warrants, subpoenas for witnesses, evidence obtained as
a result of the use of such pretrial documents, and tangible items
of evidence including pictorial and diagnostic exhibits, and all
other Court documents not specifically published as part of the
preliminary hearing proceedings[.]" (R. 957-58).

The judges thus

viewed the media's generic constitutional argument about access to
"pretrial

documents"

as

encompassing

"access" to

documentary

evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing and thereby made part
of the justice court file.4
Over two months later, at a hearing on objections to proposed
findings and conclusions, the media raised the separate issue of a
right to "access" and copy any evidence admitted at a preliminary
hearing (Transcript of Hearing January 19, 1990, at 38-39, 64). A
surprised Judge Ballif stated that the media

"has never been

admitted beyond the bar," and Judge Park agreed (.Id. at 60-61).
Judge Ballif stated he had never had a request from the media to
come into the counsel area and view exhibits admitted into evidence
during a court proceeding (Id. at 61).
4

Once a preliminary hearing

This view is eminently reasonable in light of the fact that
the transcripts of defendants' statements to police, the only
evidence at the preliminary hearing that does not appear in some
form in the transcripts of the preliminary hearing, was also a
"pretrial document" that was in the justice court file under seal.
10

was over, he stated he might or might not allow public access to
the documentation admitted there:
what questions come up."

"It depends on what's raised,

(Ld. at 62). Judge Ballif concluded that

the media in this case had received what they had requested, i.e.,
the preliminary hearing transcripts, which gave them access to the
same information the media would have seen and heard by attending
the preliminary hearing itself (id. at 62-63).5
As for the separate, broader issue of whether the media are
constitutionally

entitled

exhibit

to any utterance or visual

related

to physically

inspect

and

copy any

perception

at a

presumptively open court proceeding, Judge Ballif added,
That's another matter. I don't think that we could
frame anything that would give you a right to go to the
Supreme Court and get an advisory opinion on that. You'd
have to have a particular instance occur before that could
develop that far in the judicial process.
(Id.

at

63).

Judge

Ballif

reiterated

that

this

separate

constitutional issue of access to any and all evidence admitted in
open court had not been part of the media's previous presentation
of issues for the district court's resolution.
State agreed.

(.Id. at 65). The

(Id., at 67).

Consistent with this discussion with counsel, the court's
findings again defined the "pretrial documents" encompassed by its
prior ruling, rejecting the media's first amendment access claim,
as:
the probable cause statements, affidavits in support of
5

Judges Park and Ballif were never advised by the media that
the contents of these interview transcripts were not included in
the opened transcripts of the preliminary hearing.
11

search warrants, subpoenas for witnesses, evidence obtained
as the result of the use of such pretrial documents and
tangible items of evidence including pictorial or
diagrammatic exhibits received in evidence at the
preliminary hearing and all other Court documents, not
specifically published as part of the preliminary hearing
proceedings before the committing magistrate, per se, but
filed with the Justice Court in furtherance of the actual
court hearing.
(Finding of Fact 24, R. 1069).
The court concluded that the media had failed to establish
either prong of the Press Enterprise II test for extending a
constitutional right of access to court-filed pretrial documents in
these criminal cases (Conclusions of Law, R. 1072-73).

Since the

court also found no common law right of access to these documents,
the seal on the court file was continued (Conclusions of Law, R.
1074).

With regard to the evidence admitted at the preliminary

hearing, itemized above, the district court made no separate
conclusion as to whether there is a common law right of access in
Utah or a constitutionally protected, presumptive right of public
access, for purposes of inspection and copying, before trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The media asked the trial judges in this case to declare what
no other court has declared, i.e., that there is a first amendment
presumptive right of public access to any pretrial document, in any
type of case, once that document is filed in any court. The media
could not support their request with the historical/structural
showing required by Press Enterprise II that would counsel in favor
of such a broad extension of first amendment law. There is simply
no history anywhere of unrestricted public access to any document
12

once filed in any court.

Indeed, the history and practice in Utah

and elsewhere permit a court to seal entire court files or selected
documents within them in some circumstances.
public

policy

reasons

supporting

these

There are numerous

practices,

including

recognition of individual privacy rights, the protection of minors,
and the need to conduct criminal investigations in secrecy.
With regard to the particular pretrial documents at issue here,
there are no public warrant or subpoena issuance proceedings, and
there

is no history of unrestricted

public

access

to these

processes or to the documents filed in connection with them.
Public access would hinder, not help, the functioning of these
early phases of the criminal justice process.

In light of this,

this Court should affirm the trial court and join numerous other
courts that have held there is no first amendment presumptive right
of public access to pretrial documents, including warrant and
subpoena materials.
The trial court was not asked to rule on whether the state
constitution guarantees such presumptive public access to any
pretrial

document

constitution

does

in

any

not.

court

file,

even

Accordingly,

this

if

the

federal

separate

state

constitutional claim was not properly preserved in the trial court
and should not be considered on appeal for the first time.

If it

is addressed, it should be rejected for the same reasons the
federal constitutional claim should be rejected.
The recently developed federal common law right of access to
judicial documents in federal court is not determinative of, or
13

even instructive on, the issue of whether there is such a common
law right in Utah,

The media failed to demonstrate to the trial

court that there is a common law right in Utah of public access to
any pretrial document once filed in any court, including warrant
and subpoena materials.

Even if there were, that right has been

modified by legislative enactments detailing the public's broad
statutory right to inspect and copy public writings, including
judicial records.
The media declined to give the trial court an opportunity to
rule on whether there is any public right, before trial, to
physically handle, inspect, and copy exhibits introduced into
evidence at a preliminary hearing.

Hence, the issues related to

such evidence—which here includes blood, bone, and hair samples,
bloody levis, fingerprint impressions, and numerous photographs of
the mutilated homicide victim, as well as tapes and transcripts of
pretrial police interviews of the defendants—have been waived and
are not properly before this Court on appeal.

On the merits, the

media have failed to demonstrate any compelling historical or
practical basis favoring a constitutional right of physical access
by the public, before trial, to physically handle

and

copy

evidentiary exhibits, which may be needed at a subsequent criminal
trial.

In any event, the public's right of access to exhibits as

judicial records is governed solely by statute in Utah.

14

ARGUMENTS
I.
THE MEDIA FAILED TO SATISFY EITHER PRONG OF THE PRESS
ENTERPRISE II TEST FOR EXTENDING EXISTING LAW AND HOLDING THERE IS
A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF PRESUMPTIVE PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS
FILED IN COURT IN CONJUNCTION WITH WARRANT AND SUBPOENA ISSUANCE.
A.
There is no history of public warrant or subpoena
issuance proceedings, and no history of unrestricted access
to all pretrial documents filed in any court or to the
specific pretrial documents filed in conjunction with these
criminal investigatory processes.
In the district court, as on appeal, the media asserted that
the public has a presumptive first amendment right of access to any
"pretrial documents" once they are filed in court.

In this case,

the "pretrial documents" at issue are probable cause statements
filed in support of arrest warrants, affidavits in support of
search warrants, and witness subpoenas filed in conjunction with
the phases of a criminal investigation and prosecution prior to
preliminary hearing.
Although media claim that an "overwhelming majority" of cases
considering the issue have concluded that there is such a broad
first amendment right that attaches to any document once filed in
any court in any type of case (Appellants' Opening Brief at 17),
the State of Utah is aware of no such majority, overwhelming or
otherwise, and the media have cited none. Indeed, the State knows
of no court that has held what the media seeks here, i.e., a ruling
that the public has a first amendment right of access to any
document in a civil or criminal case once it is filed in any court.6
6

The Tenth Circuit has, in fact, summarily rejected a
similarly broad claim that the first amendment gives the public a
presumptive right of access to all documents once they are filed in
a court file. United States v. Hickev, 767 F.2d 705, 709 (10th
15

Each court considering a first amendment access claim in the
context of a criminal prosecution has instead begun by focusing on
the nature of the specific filed document sought and the nature of
the specific part of the criminal prosecution process to which the
document sought relates.

Thus, the constitutional issue in this

appeal, more properly framed, is:

Is there a first amendment

presumptive right of public access extending to pretrial documents
filed in connection with the criminal warrant or subpoena issuance
processes? Most courts that have considered this question in light
of Press Enterprise II have answered, "No."
In Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, the United States
Supreme

Court

enunciated

a

two-part

standard

embodying

"considerations of experience and logic" for determining whether
the public's presumptive right of public access to criminal trials,
a right grounded in the first amendment, extends to other pretrial
proceedings in criminal prosecutions.

The Court asked, first,

"whether the place and process have historically been open to the
public," and second, "whether public access plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question."
Cir.), cert, denied sub nom Hopkinson v. United States, 106 S.Ct.
576 (1985); accord Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-34
(1984) (media has no first amendment right to access and publish
information in civil pretrial depositions and interrogatories);
United States v. Noriega, 752 F.Supp. 1037, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(press has no first amendment right of access to court-filed
transcripts of taped conversation between defendant and his
attorneys); Gannett Co., Inc. v. State, 571 A.2d 735 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1989) (applies Press Enterprise II and finds no first amendment
right of access to court's list of jurors' names), cert, denied,
110 S.Ct. 1947 (1990).
16

Although this historical/structural standard was formulated in
the context of the first amendment's guarantee of access to
pretrial criminal proceedings,

the district court and the parties

in this case agreed that it should govern the court's determination
of whether to extend existing law by concluding that the public has
a presumptive right of access to any pretrial documents

filed in

court in conjunction with the pre-preliminary hearing phases of a
criminal investigation.

As the cases below demonstrate, other

courts faced with the same issue presented here have done so.
Although the media rely heavily on several Ninth Circuit cases,
they do not mention the most recent Ninth Circuit decision, which
is directly on point.

The court rejected the notion that it had,

in Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143
(9th Cir. 1983), already found a right of access to all pretrial
documents. Finding both considerations in the Press Enterprise II
standard lacking, the unanimous panel held that there is no first
amendment presumptive right of access to warrant materials filed in
district courts, including search warrants, supporting affidavits,
and inventories of the evidence seized after execution of the
warrants.

Times-Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210 (9th

Cir. 1989). With regard to the first part of the Press Enterprise
II test, the court found no historical tradition of open warrant
proceedings or materials, which it considered extensions of the
criminal investigation itself:
We know of no historical tradition of public access to
warrant proceedings. Indeed, our review of the history of
the warrant process in this country indicates that the
issuance of search warrants has traditionally been carried
17

out in secret. Normally a search warrant is issued after
an ex parte application by the government and an in camera
consideration by a judge or magistrate.
Id. at 1213-14.7

As the panel noted, the United States Supreme

Court recognized in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978),
that proceedings for the issuance of search warrants are, of
necessity, secret and not open to the public for the reason that
such openness would alert the subject of the search. Times Mirror
Co.. 873 F.2d at 1214; accord Newspapers of New England v. ClerkMagistrate, 531 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 n.9 (Mass. 1988).

See also

United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321
(1972) (government must comply with fourth amendment's warrant
requirement when engaging in domestic intelligence gathering;
government's interest in keeping such investigations secret remains
protected

because

"warrant application

involves no public or

adversary proceeding1').
The Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the media's claim that
the usual practice of filing warrant materials with the court
without obtaining an order sealing them prevented any conclusion
that

there

is no history of unrestricted

access to warrant

materials. The government, the court pointed out, has always been
able to restrict access to warrant materials by seeking a sealing

7

For this, the court cited In re Search Warrant for
Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn,, 855 F.2d 569, 573
(8th Cir. 1988), in which the Eighth Circuit also concluded there
was no history of public access to warrant proceedings.
Nonetheless, purporting to apply the Press Enterprise II standard,
the Eighth Circuit found a first amendment right of access to
affidavits in support of search warrants, discussed below at 27-34.
18

order, which courts have granted to preserve secrecy deemed by the
government as necessary to a criminal investigation. .Id. at 1214;
see also Seattle Times Co. v. Eberharter, 713 P.2d 710 (Wash. 1986)
(applying

historical/structural

analysis

and

rejecting

first

amendment right of public access to search warrant and supporting
affidavits because no historical tradition of access).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has for the same reasons
recently joined the Ninth Circuit and held that the media do not
have a first amendment right of access to affidavits filed in
support of search warrants.

Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d

60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989) (followed in In re Application and Affidavit
for Search Warrant, 923 F.2d 324, 326 (4th Cir. 1991), cert, denied
sub nom Hughes v. Washington Post Co., Ill S.Ct. 2243 (1991)).
Applying the first part of the Press Enterprise II test, the Goetz
court concluded there was, of necessity, no history of warrant
application proceedings being open to the public. .Id. at 64. The
Fourth Circuit concluded the same

"common sense" reasons why

warrant application proceedings are not open to the public support
its conclusion that the media have no first amendment right of
access, before or after warrant execution, to a sealed affidavit
filed in support of a search warrant.
Fourth

Circuit

also agreed

Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64. The

that the mere

fact

that warrant

materials are routinely filed in court without a seal after
execution does not mean that such access is "demanded by the first
amendment."

Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64.

In the instant case, the media presented to the district court

19

no evidence of any different history in Utah of public access to
warrant

application

proceedings

or

to

the

subpoena

issuance

process. In Utah, both processes typically do not involve pretrial
court

"proceedings"

involvement

at

all,

although

of a judicial officer.

warrants

require

the

See Utah R. Crim P. 6

(magistrate issues warrant or summons for accused after return of
indictment or filing of information and supporting probable cause
statement); Utah R. Crim P. 14(a) (witness subpoena may be issued
by magistrate, county attorney, or court; court clerk may issue
signed subpoenas to defendant); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4 (1990)
(magistrate issues search warrant after finding probable cause);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-10 (1990) (authorizing telephonic issuance of
arrest warrants); see also KUTV v. Conder, 635 P. 2d 412 (Utah 1981)
(secrecy in hearing under Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 7722-1 to -4 (1990), is to protect innocent and to prevent criminal
suspects from having access to information before prosecution).
The media also did not demonstrate a differing history in
Utah with regard to a trial court's authority—inherent, statutory,
or by court rule—to seal a document in a court file. There simply
is no history in Utah of unrestricted public access to any document
once filed in any court regardless of the type or stage of judicial
proceeding to which it relates. Although filing in a court may be
the starting point for any analysis of the public's ability to gain
access to a document, see Carter v. Utah Power and Light Co., 800
P.2d 1095, 1099 (Utah 1990), the fact of filing alone is not, and
has never been, determinative of the public access question.
20

Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-202, relied upon here by
the media on appeal (though not cited to the trial court), itself
supports the conclusion that there is no general "right" in Utah of
public access to any document in a court file, but only to those
court-filed documents open to the public because classified as
"public data."

Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-202(1)(A). The Code

of Judicial Administration allows courts to seal and thereby
categorically deny public access to nonpublic documents in court
files that are: a) "private" judicial records, including driver's
license histories, civil commitment proceedings, and sealed divorce
case

records; b)

"confidential"

court

case

files,

including

criminal presentence reports,8 custodial evaluations, home studies,
and psychological evaluations, and other case records designated by
statute, court order, or administrative rule as confidential; and
c) judicial records sealed pursuant to statute or court rule. Utah
Code Jud. Admin. Rules 4-202(3)(G), 4-202(4)(B), 4-202(5). Rule 4205(4)(A) provides:

"Sealed, confidential, and private records

shall not be available to the public."

See also Utah R. Civ. P.

26(c) (permitting sealing of discovery materials upon showing of
good cause);9 Utah R. Crim P. 16 (authorizing protective orders and
8

The Seventh Circuit recently held that the media have no
first amendment right of access to a presentence report,
notwithstanding the media's first amendment right to attend the
sentencing hearing itself. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224
(7th Cir. 1989).
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has already
held that a court rule authorizing a trial court to make a pretrial
discovery document nonpublic upon a showing of "good cause" does
not violate the first amendment. The Court expressly refused to
require that the "good cause" standard incorporate a first
21

sealing of statements in course of discovery in criminal case);
Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-702 (all juvenile court records are
confidential, accessible only to limited individuals); Utah Code
Jud. Admin. Rule 4-207 (providing procedure for court expungement
and sealing of court records in criminal cases, including cases in
which charges were never filed). These rules track the language in
the now-repealed 1951 Archives and Records Services and Information
Practices Act, which opened

"public data" to the public but

excluded from this category:

data on individuals classified as

private or confidential as well as data otherwise restricted by law
from disclosure, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-61(10) (1939); and data on
individuals relating to criminal investigations, Utah Code Ann. §
63-2-89 (1989).10
Numerous other Utah statutes render certain documents in court
files, or entire court files, nonpublic or allow the courts to make

amendment presumption of openness of judicial documents.
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36-37 & n.23.
10

Seattle

This policy in Utah against unrestricted access to any
document filed in any court is likewise expressed in the new
Government Records Access and Management Act [GRAMA], effective
July 1, 1992, in which the legislature stated that it is sometimes
necessary to restrict public access to some governmental records.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(2), (3)(b) (Supp. 1992). GRAMA excludes
from accessible "public records" any records classified by the
holder as private, controlled, or protected, and any records to
which access is restricted pursuant to statute or court rule, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-2-201 (3) (Supp. 1992), and records held by a court
to be confidential because of a "compelling interest," Utah Code
Ann. S 63-2-405 (3) (Supp. 1992). Records created for criminal
enforcement purposes may be classified as protected, Utah Code Ann.
S 63-2-304(8) (Supp. 1992), and records containing data on
individuals that, if disclosed would result in a clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy, may be classified as private, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d) (Supp. 1992).
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them nonpublic. JU^. , Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10(9) (1990) (judge
issuing

order for interception

communications

shall

seal

of wire, electronic, or oral

order,

application

therefor,

and

transcription of intercepted communications); Utah Code Ann. § 7718-2 (Supp. 1992) (authorizing court expungement and sealing of all
records in a criminal case, including those where no charges were
brought); Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-6 (Supp. 1992) (court may seal
record to protect trade secrets); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-247
(1989) (seal on all records in judicial commitment proceedings);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-15 (1992) (court must seal all documents
filed in connection with adoption); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-55(l)
(1992) (court records shall be open to juvenile's parents or
custodians, parties, or their attorneys); Utah Code Ann. § 30-34(2) (Supp. 1992) (file in divorce action may be sealed on motion
of either party); Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(7)-(8) (Supp. 1992)
(authorizing
witnesses

and

closed

criminal

closure

of

investigative

records

filed

in

interrogation
conjunction

of
with

investigation, for good cause); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-10a2(1)(a), -13(2) (Supp. 1992) (pre-grand jury hearings and grand
jury proceedings are not publicly accessible); see generally.
Anno., "Public Access to State Court Records," 84 A.L.R.3d 598
(1978).
In short, although most documents are publicly accessible once
they are filed in a court, there is no history of unrestricted
public access to all court-filed documents in Utah. Thus, there is
no historical tradition counseling in favor of recognizing a far23

reaching presumptive first amendment right of public access to all
pretrial documents filed in any court or to the particular pretrial
documents at issue here.
B.
Presumptive public access to warrant and subpoena
application processes, and to the "pretrial documents"
filed in court in conjunction with them, would not play a
significant positive role in the functioning of these
investigative processes.
It would, on the contrary,
seriously interfere with those processes.
The media cite many cases and suggest they support its view
that, under the Press Enterprise

II test, there is a first

amendment right of access to any pretrial document once filed in a
court. However, most of the cited cases involve access to pretrial
criminal

proceedings

themselves

or

to

documents

filed

in

conjunction with presumptively open criminal pretrial proceedings.
E.g., Seattle Times Co. v. United States District Court, 845 F.2d
1513 (9th Cir. 1988) (media has first amendment right of access to
pretrial release/bail proceeding in court and thus to access
documents filed in court in conjunction with that proceeding); CBS,
Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985)
(first amendment presumptive right of public access applies to
post-trial proceeding, motion to reduce sentence, and documents
filed in connection with same); Associated Press v. United States
Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983) (invalidating sua sponte
trial court order, issued two months after indictment of John
DeLorean and others, sealing all documents thereafter filed with
the court; first amendment presumption of open pretrial proceedings
applies generally to documents filed in regard to them); United
States v. Haller, 837 F.2d

84, 86-87
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(2nd Cir. 1988) (first

amendment right of access extends to plea hearings, historically
open to the public, and thus to plea agreements filed in connection
with them); Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 287-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3rd Cir.
1982) (pretrial suppression hearing); In Re Washington Post Co,,
807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986) (sentencing hearing and documents).11
Although it may seem at first blush that the Vermont Supreme
Court has extended a first amendment right of public access to
warrant documents, its decisions are actually grounded on a state
statutory access right.

In State v. Tallman, 537 A.2d 422 (Vt.

1987), the trial court had, at defendant's request, closed parts of
a suppression hearing to the public and sealed a probable cause

u

Three other cited cases provide no authority for the media's
first amendment argument. In In re Search Warrant served upon John
Doe Partnership, 548 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393, 145 Misc. 783 (Sup.Ct.
1989), the New York trial judge specifically declined to reach the
issue of any first amendment right of public access to a search
warrant affidavit. In Journal Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 456 A.2d
963 (Md. App. 1983), decided long before Press Enterprise II, an
intermediate appellate court held that the first amendment
presumptive right of public access to criminal trials and pretrial
proceedings precluded an order closing pretrial suppression
hearings and a blanket trial order sealing all the court files in
seven cases against a single defendant, which included the probable
cause statements in support of defendant's arrest. On further
appeal, however, the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to review
the appropriateness of the court file closure order, finding that
it had become moot. Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 297 Md.
68, 465 A.2d 426, 435 (1983). Similarly, the Pennsylvania trial
court in In re Affidavit for Search Warrant, 12 Media L. Rptr. 1904
(Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1986), concluded that access to probable
cause statements not filed in court was part and parcel of the
right to attend pretrial proceedings, relying on the decision of
the intermediate appellate court in Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker,
348 Pa. Super. 230, 502 A.2d 1316 (Pa. Super. 1986).
When
Fenstermaker was appealed, however, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania expressly declined to reach the first amendment issue
since it analyzed the access, issue as one of state common law.
Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 314 (Pa. 1987).
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statement that contained information testified to at that closed
hearing. The appellate court vacated the closure order, concluding
the suppression hearing was presumptively open under the Press
Enterprise II test. .Id. at 426. Moving on to the issue of access
to

the

warrant

materials,

the

court

spoke

in

terms

of

a

"constitutional right of access to public records," but did not
apply the Press Enterprise II analysis.

Instead, it cited as

authority for a "right" of access to warrant materials the dictum
in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978),
that there is "a general right to inspect and copy public records
and documents, including judicial records," which refers to a
refers to a federal common law right of access.

In Nixon, the

United States Supreme Court expressly rejected a claim of a first
amendment presumptive right of physical access to evidence admitted
at trial, i.e., audiotapes of presidential conversations.

Thus,

Nixon could have provided the Vermont court no authority for
finding a first amendment right of access. Instead, the affidavits
in support of an arrest warrant were held in Tallman to be "public
records" accessible to the public under a Vermont statute once they
were filed in a court. In light of this, Tallman and its progeny—
Greenwood v. Wolchik, 544 A.2d 1156 (Vt. 1988), which relied in
part on the intermediate appellate decision in Fenstermaker, see
note 11, supra—provide no persuasive authority for the media's
sweeping first amendment claim here.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely held that,
under Press Enterprise II, the first amendment presumptive right of
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public access extends to judicial documents, including court-filed
affidavits in support of search warrant applications. In re Search
Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn,
F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Gunn].

855

The Eighth Circuit's

application of the Press Enterprise II standard and its first
amendment holding have been criticized and expressly rejected by
the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, as well as by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Newspapers of New England v. ClerkMagistrate, 531 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1988), which have all held there
is no first amendment right of public access to search warrant
affidavits.
Gunn involved the media's July 1988 request to unseal
affidavits and other materials attached to two search warrants
executed a month before at McDonnell Douglas Corporation as part of
Operation 111 Wind, a nationwide FBI investigation of fraud and
bribery in the defense industry that also gave rise to the Times
Mirror decision.

On appeal from a trial court order declining to

lift the seal, the Eighth Circuit first acknowledged that the
process of search warrant issuance is necessarily not open to the
public. The panel went on to conclude that the warrant materials,
once filed without seal, become accessible under the federal common
law right of public access to public records recognized in Nixon.
Id. at 573.

Viewing a search warrant as an integral part of a

criminal prosecution, the court then jumped to the second Press
Enterprise II consideration and found that public access to warrant
documents is:

a) important to the public's understanding of the
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function and operation of the judicial process and the criminal
justice system; and b) may operate as a curb on prosecutorial or
judicial misconduct.

Satisfied that the Press Enterprise II test

had been met, the court extended a first amendment presumptive
right of public access to warrant materials.

It nonetheless

refused to unseal these documents, concluding that the qualified
public access right must give way to the compelling governmental
interest of an ongoing criminal investigation.

Gunn, 855 F.2d at

574.
There
analysis.12
Press

are

several

things

wrong

with

the

Gunn

court's

First, it effectively discards the first half of the

Enterprise

II test by ignoring whether

the underlying

proceeding to which the documents relate has historically been
publicly accessible. See Newspapers of New England, 531 N.E.2d at
1266; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 510 (1st Cir.
1989) (no first amendment access to judicial records of grand jury
proceeding not resulting in indictment).

The same commonsense

reasons underlying the nonpublicness of the warrrant issuance
process support the nonpublicness of the judicial documents used in
that process.

Times Mirror. 873 F.2d at 1217.

Second, the Gunn

court finds a history of public access to all court-filed warrant
12

Two factors, not present here, may have led to the court's
strained first amendment reasoning in this high profile case: 1)
there was no pending civil or criminal case against McDonnell
Douglas or its employee, Dunn, in which the media could have
obtained the warrant materials as part of its exercise of the right
to attend pretrial hearings such as suppression hearings; and 2)
there is no federal statutory right of access to judicial records
because federal courts are exempt from the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. S 551(1)(B) (1977).
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documents based on the government's practice of filing only some
warrant documents under seal, and uses this as a basis for
concluding that the first amendment demands that all warrant
documents be filed unsealed.

Properly viewed, however, the fact

that most warrant documents are not filed under seal "merely
describes a practice in cases where the government presumably
believes secrecy unnecessary; it does not establish that the First
Amendment requires that warrant materials be filed without seal."
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217; accord Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64.
Third, as evidence of a history of access to warrant materials
sufficient to support a constitutional right of access, Gunn
confusingly relies on Nixon.

As noted above, Nixon recognized a

federal common law right of access to judicial documents, including
trial exhibits, as public records, but also rejected a presumptive
first amendment right of public access to evidence admitted at
trial.

The Fourth Circuit has correctly identified the Gunn

court's mistake, one the media are asking this Court to repeat:
" [RJecognizing that search warrants are judicial records . . . does
not answer the question whether the press has a right of access
secured by either the first amendment or the common law."

Goetz,

886 F.2d at 64.13
13

There are important differences between constitutional and
common law rights of access.
A first amendment right of
presumptive access can be denied only by proof of a compelling
governmental interest and then only if nondisclosure is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. In contrast, the federal common
law right of access can be denied by a trial judge exercising
discretion in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of each
case. Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64; see In re Washington Post Co., 807
F.2d at 390.
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Fourth, Gunn misapplies the second part of the Press Enterprise
II test, under which the relevant consideration is whether creating
public access would play "a significant positive role in the
functioning

of

the

particular

process

in

question."

Press

Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. The "particular process" that should
have been examined in Gunn was the warrant issuance process, but
instead the court focused on the entire criminal justice system.
See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1213. The media in the instant case
similarly focus broadly, instead of narrowly on the particular
processes in question.
This wide-angled approach makes it easy to argue—as the media
have in this case, in Times Mirror, and in Gunn—that public access
would be beneficial by increasing the public's information about
and involvement in the judicial system and by providing additional
citizen scrutiny of public officials' actions. The media are thus
essentially arguing that the first amendment compels openness of
any document filed in a court if these ends would thereby be
served. This Court should reject this oversimplistic argument, as
has the Ninth Circuit, for several reasons.

These goals of

creating a citizenry that is informed about its judicial process
and

the

workings

of

its

criminal

justice

system,

although

undeniably worthy, can be and are achieved through public access to
presumptively open pretrial criminal proceedings and the documents
filed in conjunction with them.

In addition, official abuses of

power in the warrant or subpoena issuance processes are effectively
policed by the parties themselves, i.e., by the accused at a
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suppression hearing or trial or by a civil litigant in a damage
action.

See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1218; see also Gannett Co.,

Inc. v. DePasauale, 443 U.S. 368f 383 (1979).
Most importantly, as the Ninth Circuit cautioned, a first
amendment right should not be created in knee-jerk response to the
media's claim that presumptive access to any judicial proceeding or
any document filed in any court will benefit us as citizens:
Were we to accept this argument, few, if any, judicial
proceedings would remain closed.
Every judicial
proceeding, indeed every governmental process arguably
benefits from public scrutiny to some degree, in that
openness leads to a better-informed citizenry and tends to
deter government officials from abusing the powers of
government. However, complete openness would undermine
important values that are preserved by keeping some
proceedings closed to the public.
Openness may, for
example, frustrate criminal investigations and thereby
jeopardize the integrity of the search for truth that is so
critical to the fair administration of justice.
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1213.

In sum, although the public's

legitimate interests in informed self governance and prevention of
abuses of power would arguably be furthered by opening up every
judicial proceeding and every document filed in a court, the same
benefits

could

be

said

to

flow from

opening

up grand

jury

proceedings,14 jury deliberations, or the internal communications
and deliberations of judges on an appellate court.

Id.

But because the integrity and independence of these
proceedings are threatened by public disclosures, claims of
"improved self governance" and the "promotion of fairness"
cannot be used as an incantation to open these proceedings
1A

The United States Supreme Court has recognized, in the very
case the media rely so heavily on, that "there are some kinds of
government operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted
openly," citing grand jury proceedings as an example.
Press
Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9.
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to the public. Nor will the mere recitation of these
interests open a particular proceeding merely because it is
in some way integral to our criminal justice system.
IdLike the media in Times Mirror, the media in this case have
failed to satisfy Press Enterprise II by demonstrating how openness
of warrant documents and an open warrant issuance procedure would
positively contribute to the criminal investigatory process. Their
inability to do so is understandable, since openness of warrant
materials would not improve the functioning of the warrant process.
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217. Indeed, the right of public access
at any point in that process would seriously jeopardize it by
discouraging potential sources of valuable information and by
increasing the risks that suspects or arrest warrant subjects would
flee or destroy evidence. JEci. at 1215. Because the social utility
of open warrant processes and warrant documents is outweighed by
the

substantial

burden

openness

would

impose

on

criminal

investigations, the second prong of Press Enterprise II is not
satisfied in this case.

See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217.

Finally, although the difficulties in implementing any new
first amendment right of access to all court-filed documents are
not determinative of whether such a right should be recognized, the
Court should not ignore the practical implications of the expansive
right sought by the media in the trial court and in this Court. A
ruling that all court-filed documents are presumptively open under
the first amendment as interpreted in Press Enterprise II would
effectively repeal the numerous Utah statutes and court rules that
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currently authorize the sealing of some court-filed documents,
discussed

above at pages

involvement

of, members

19-23, without
of the public.

prior notice
If all

to or

court-filed

documents are presumptively open to the public, no court can
henceforth seal an entire category of case files or documents
within court files, regardless of how confidential or private the
information contained in them, and no matter how important secrecy
may be to an ongoing criminal investigation.

Instead, the media

contends, notice and hearing must be afforded—before sealing—to
the media and the public, at which the person favoring sealing
(possibly a mother giving up a child for adoption, a rehabilitated
delinquent, a mental patient, or a prosecutor in the middle of an
ongoing racketeering investigation) must bear the heavy legal,
emotional, and financial burdens of showing why a court document
should not be open to a newspaper reporter, or to a business
competitor, or to a nosy neighbor.
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, in a case
rejecting a claimed first amendment right of the media to publish
the contents of pretrial discovery materials that the trial court
had subjected to a protective order under a "good cause" standard,
heightened first amendment scrutiny of the sealing of any court
record or document would require burdensome evidentiary findings
and lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals.
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36 n.23.

Seattle Times

The Ninth Circuit also

noted this practical problem in the context of presumptive public
access to pretrial warrant documents:
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Our decision that no qualified right of access exists
relieves the government of the considerable burden of
responding on a case-by-case basis to actions such as these
brought during the middle of an ongoing investigation. In
contrast, the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit in
[Gunn] requires the government to carry the burden of
demonstrating on the facts of each case a compelling need
for secrecy.
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217 n.8.

Furthermore, exactly how

compelling a private or governmental interest in sealing would have
to be to outweigh a beefy first amendment right of presumptive
public access to pretrial court documents is not addressed by the
media, which apparently believe that only sixth amendment rights
can, and should, ever prevail over their first amendment rights.
In light of the inherent supervisory power of courts over
access to their own records and files, and perhaps influenced by
the real life difficulties flowing from a holding that all pretrial
court documents are presumptively open to the public under the
first amendment, numerous federal courts have rejected or declined
to reach first amendment claims like the media's here.

They have

instead analyzed the extent of public access to judicial materials
under the more flexible federal common law right, see note 13,
supra,

which

discretion.

is

subject

to

the

trial

judge's

considerable

In addition to In re Application and Affidavit for a

Search Warrant, Washington Post Co. v. Hughes, 923 F.2d 324 (4th
Cir. 1991), cert, denied sub nom Hughes v. Washington Post Co., Ill
S.Ct. 2243 (1991), a case also involving access to an affidavit in
support of a search warrant, see, for example, Nixon, 435 U.S. at
597-99

(tapes);

Hiekev,

767

F.2d

at

708

(plea

agreement);

Application of Newsdav, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir.) (search
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warrant application), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 2631 (1990); Goetz,
886 F.2d at 65 (access to search warrant affidavit); In re Search
Warrants Issued May 21, 1987, 1990 W.L. 113874 (D. D.C. 1990)
(same); United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. at 1040 (transcripts
of tapes); but see Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1218-19 (rejecting
both first amendment and federal common law right of public access
to all pretrial

documents).

Some

state

supreme

courts, in

decisions also cited as supporting authority by the media, have
used

the

same

pragmatic

approach

under

state

common

law.

Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 419 (access to arrest
warrant affidavits); Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 637 P.2d 966
(Wash. 1981) (access to court-filed affidavits of probable cause,
search warrants and returns on them).
Because the media have failed to make the showing of
"experience and logic" required by Press Enterprise II before
extending a first amendment presumptive right of public access to
court filed documents, this Court should affirm the trial court's
holding that there is no such right of public access to any
pretrial documents once filed in any court, including warrant and
subpoena issuance materials.15

15

In the narrow context of warrant proceedings, this result
protects the important privacy interests of those innocent parties
who are investigated but never charged with a crime. Times Mirror,
873 F.2d at 1216.
Significant privacy interests of others
involved, often not voluntarily, in judicial proceedings—mothers
surrendering babies for adoption, persons in treatment for mental
illness, businesses with trade secrets sued by competitors—will
likewise be protected by this court's rejection of a broad first
amendment right of public access to any court-filed document.
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II. THE MEDIA WAIVED THEIR DISTINCT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
BASED ON ARTICLE I, SECTION 15, BY NOT RAISING IT AND OBTAINING A
RULING ON IT FIRST IN THE TRIAL COURT. IN ANY EVENT, THIS COURT
SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THAT PROVISION AS CREATING A PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT
OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT-FILED PRETRIAL DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING
WARRANT AND SUBPOENA MATERIALS, FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT IT SHOULD
REJECT THE MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM.
The media assert that, even if there is no right of public
access to court-filed pretrial documents under the Press Enterprise
IJ.

standard,

this

Court

should

apply

a

separate

state

constitutional test and find such an independent right under
article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution.

This provision,

the media now contend, provides broader public access to court
documents than the first amendment because it uses the words
"abridge or restrain" instead of just the word "abridging."
Absent exceptional circumstances, a claim raised on appeal for
the first time, even a constitutional claim, is not properly
preserved for consideration by an appellate court.

Espinal v.

Board of Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990); State v. Anderson,
789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920
(Utah App. 1991).

The proper forum in which to commence state

constitutional analysis and interpretation is the trial court.
State v. Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 72, 74 (Utah App. 1992); State
v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990).

The trial court

here was not asked to determine whether there is a separate test
under article I, section 15, for guaranteeing public access to
pretrial court documents, distinct from the Press Enterprise II
standard, and, if so, whether that test was met in this case.
Accordingly, this Court should decline to address the issue.
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If the state constitutional claim is nonetheless reached, it
should be rejected on the merits. The State of Utah does not agree
that this Court has ever articulated a standard by which to measure
the scope of the Utah Constitution's guarantee of freedom of the
press as it relates to all pretrial court-filed documents and not
just to pretrial criminal proceedings.

The test crafted and used

by the media, i.e., whether court-filed pretrial documents "are
crucial to preserving an informed involvement in the operations of
government," is so nebulous as to constitute no guiding standard at
all. As noted above, an arguable benefit to an informed citizenry
is alone insufficient basis for holding that the constitution
demands presumptive public access to any document in a court file,
since similar benefits would likely flow from complete openness of
every governmental process and governmental record.

Scrutiny of

judges and prosecutors and the community's knowledge of, and
involvement in, the criminal justice system is provided, as this
Court has recognized, through constitutionally guaranteed public
access to and attendance at pretrial criminal proceedings.

See

Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1177
(Utah 1987); Kearns-Tribune, 685 P.2d at 518.
The media have provided no historical or logical basis for
expansively interpreting article I, section 15 as creating a state
constitutional right and thereby mandating that every document
filed in any Utah court, including documents connected to warrant
or subpoena issuance, be presumptively open to the public. Indeed,
the history in Utah and elsewhere of restricted public access or
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nonaccess to warrant and subpoena issuance processes and to some
categories of court files or court documents, detailed above under
Point I, counsels strongly against the state constitutionalization
of presumptive public access to them under the Utah Constitution.
The Utah statutes allowing for sealing of some court documents,
including pretrial documents, reflect the collective view of the
people of this state that the public's and the India's access to
information found in court documents is, in some circumstances,
trumped by individual privacy interests, our societal interest in
protecting juveniles, or the public need to investigate suspected
crime in secrecy.
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THERE IS NO UTAH COMMON
LAW RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT-FILED PRETRIAL DOCUMENTS IN
UTAH.
EVEN IF THERE WERE, IT HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED BY STATUTES
REGULATING PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUDICIAL RECORDS AS PUBLIC WRITINGS.
The media have cited to the trial court and to this Court
several federal cases recognizing a federal common law right of
public access to judicial records as public records, including
pretrial documents once filed in court.

This right is subject to

the trial court's exercise of discretion under the relevant facts
and circumstances of each case.

In addition, the media cite the

opinions of two state courts that have recognized a similar state
common law right of public access to documents once filed in court.
(Media Opening Brief at 30).
These cases from other jurisdictions, however, provide no
precedential authority for a conclusion that there is such a common
law right in Utah.

See State ex rel. KOIN-TV v. Olsen, 711 P.2d

966, 971 (Ore. 1985) (federal courts "ordinarily not the place in
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which [the Oregon Supreme Court] would seek the common law"). Utah
has, by statute first enacted at statehood in 1898, adopted the
common law insofar as it is not in conflict with the constitution
or laws of this state or the United States. Utah Code Ann. § 68-31 (1986);16 State ex rel. R.R. v. C.R., 797 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah
App. 1990).

Although information about the relevant common law

rules at the time of Utah statehood is sparse, the Oregon Supreme
Court has stated its view of the public's restricted ability at
common law to inspect court records kept by the clerk of the court:
"At common law no person is entitled to inspect
public records, either personally or by agent, or to make
copies, abstracts or memoranda therefrom, unless he has
such an interest therein as would enable him to maintain or
defend an action for which the record sought can be
furnished as evidence or necessary information, and the
interest of the person demanding the inspection must be
direct and tangible."
Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 118 Or. 105, 244 P. 868 (1926)
(quoting 34 Cyc. 592, 593); accord Mulford v. Davev, 64 Nev. 506,
186 P.2d 360 (1947); Burton v. Reynolds, 110 Mich. 354, 68 N.W.
217 (1896); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893); Anno.,
"Public Access to State Court Records," 84 A.L.R.3d 598, 626 §§
10(b), (d) (1978); see generally. Anno., "Restricting Access to
Judicial Records," 175 A.L.R. 1260, 1267-68 (1948).
Although actual practice with regard to public access to some
judicial documents may have altered over the years in other

i6

The statute provides: "The common law of England so far as
it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or
laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this
state . . . is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in
all courts of this state."
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American states or as a matter of federal common law applicable to
documents filed in federal courts, neither is determinative of the
common law issue in Utah.

The media have cited no Utah cases

adopting for this state a common law "right" of public access to
court-filed judicial records as public documents that is broader
than the limited public access to judicial records available at
common law.

The trial court thus correctly ruled that the media

failed to establish that the public has a common law right in Utah
of access to any pretrial document once filed in a court.
In any event, even if the trial court were wrong on this point,
any common law right of public access to pretrial documents as
judicial records has, by virtue of section 68-3-2, been superseded
in Utah by legislation that comprehensively regulates the area of
public

access to public writings

judicial records.

and public

data, including

See Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652

P.2d 1332, 1337 (Utah 1982) (statute prevails over conflicting
common law rule); see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 604-07 & n.18
(federal Presidential Recordings Act modifies federal common law
right of access to tapes admitted as evidence at trial); Mulford,
186 P.2d at 361 (statute granting right to inspect and copy all
public records altered common law rule); Bend Publishing Co., 244
P. at 869 (same).
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-2 (1992) (repealed effective April
1, 1992, by 1991 Utah Laws, ch. 259), every citizen has a right to
inspect and copy any public writing, except as otherwise expressly
provided by statute.

The term "public writing" was defined to
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specifically include judicial records. Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-1(2)
(1992). The legislature also comprehensively provided for a public
right of access to "public data" in the Archives and Records
Services and Information Practices Act# Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-66
(1992) (also repealed effective April 1, 1992 by 1991 Utah Laws,
ch. 259).17
In light of these statutes, the issue of what public access the
common law in Utah would or would not (or should or should not)
provide to the pretrial documents in a court file has been rendered
academic

by

the

legislature's

preemption

of

the

subject.

Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that there is no common law
right of public access in Utah to pretrial documents once filed in
any court, including the documents at issue here, should be
affirmed.
IV. THE MEDIA HAVE FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL ANY CLAIM OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL OR COMMON LAW RIGHT TO INSPECT AND COPY, BEFORE
TRIAL, EVIDENCE ADMITTED IN COURT, SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
RULE, AND WAS NEVER ASKED TO RULE, ON THESE CLAIMS.
In Part II of its Opening Brief, the media ask this Court to
hold that they, as well as the general public, have either a
federal constitutional right, a state constitutional right, or a
state common law right of "access," meaning the right to inspect
and copy, all exhibits admitted into evidence in court.

These

claims, presented on appeal as Issues 4-6 (Media Opening Brief at
1-2), were not briefed or argued before the trial court, and the
17

Both acts have been replaced by the comprehensive
Governmental Records Access and Management Act [GRAMA], Utah Code
Ann. SS 63-2-101 to -909 (Supp. 1992), effective July 1, 1992. See
note 10, supra.
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trial court made no ruling on them.
The trial court did conclude in its November 1989 memorandum
decision that the media had no first amendment right of presumptive
public access to any pretrial documents once filed in a court
(Decision, R. 958-61), and it accordingly declined to unseal the
court file in this case that contained the pretrial documents
(Order of October 23, 1989, R. 944). However, the judges made it
plain in this decision that they were treating the documentary
exhibits

received

into

evidence

at

the

preliminary

hearing

(transcripts of police interviews with defendants, photographs of
the victim's body taken by the medical examiner, and diagrams drawn
by the medical examiner and other witnesses) as included within the
media's generic argument about "pretrial documents."
defined

The judges

"pretrial documents" for purposes of their ruling as

encompassing,

in

addition

to warrant

affidavits

and

witness

subpoenas, all "tangible items of evidence including pictorial and
diagnostic exhibits, and all other Court documents not specifically
published as part of the preliminary hearing."

(Decision, R. 958).

Up until this ruling, the only two issues before the trial
court concerned access to pretrial documents and access to the
transcripts of the preliminary hearing. No argument was presented
by the media

concerning

access to evidence, with

the media

apparently assuming that the trial court would let them have a copy
of the transcripts of the police interviews of Wood and Archuleta
if the court ruled in their favor on the issue of access to the
preliminary hearing transcripts themselves. The separate issue of
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access to evidence did not really arise in this case until the
trial court's November 1989 ruling that lifted the seal on the
preliminary hearing transcripts but refused to lift the seal on the
"pretrial documents."
On January 11, 1990, the judges notified all parties' counsel
of a hearing to be held on January 19 concerning the parties'
objections to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of the court's prior decision•

In this notice, the judges

stated their willingness at that hearing to consider "any other
matters pertaining to the Media in the above captioned cases which
counsel deem appropriate to be considered in settling the record
for appeal," as long as the court and other counsel were given
twenty-four hours' notice of these other matters.

(R. 1034).

Although the record reveals no advance warning, the subject of
a right of physical access to evidence was first broached by the
media

at

the

January

19,

1990,

post-decisional

hearing.

(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 38-39, 64). In the
ensuing discussion between Judges Ballif and Park and the parties'
counsel, quoted above at pages 11-12, it is apparent that the
judges believed strongly that they had not theretofore been asked
to rule on any claimed right of physical "access" by the public to
evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing. At this point, the
media could have articulated these claims, along with supporting
legal authority and legal argument, and simply requested from the
trial court a supplemental ruling on the issues of access to
evidence.

However, the media took no action at this opportune
43

moment to preserve these issues properly by giving the trial court
an opportunity to rule on them first. They never even explained to
the judges what evidentiary items they wanted and why.18

They did

not ask for, and did not get, a ruling by Judges Ballif and Park on
their separate claims to a right of physical access, before trial,
to inspect and copy any evidence introduced at the preliminary
hearing.

They should not be allowed on appeal to assign as error

a ruling that Judges Ballif and Park never made, on issues to which
the State was never asked to respond. The claims should therefore
be deemed waived, and this Court should accordingly decline to
address them on the merits.

Espinal, 797 P.2d at 413; State v.

Anderson, 789 P. 2d at 29; State v. Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 82
(Utah App. 1992).
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT GIVE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
A RIGHT, PRIOR TO A CRIMINAL TRIAL, TO PHYSICALLY INSPECT AND COPY
EXHIBITS—HERE, MURDER WEAPONS, TISSUE SAMPLES, BLOODY CLOTHING,
AUDIOTAPES AND CORONER'S PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM'S MUTILATED
CORPSE, AS WELL AS DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS—ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT
A PRELIMINARY HEARING.
The media expansively claim the public has a constitutional
right19 to inspect and copy any exhibit received into evidence at
any presumptively open court proceeding, including a criminal
preliminary hearing, at any stage of the judicial process.

(Media

18

See pages 6-7, 10-11 & n.5, above.

19

Because the media have not articulated any basis for why the
Utah Constitution should be interpreted as providing any greater
right of public access, for inspection and copying of evidentiary
exhibits, than the first amendment does, the State does not analyze
the state constitutional question separately from the federal. See
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v.
Brooks, 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 31 n.2 (Utah App. 1992).
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Opening Brief at 15-16). There is, however, no such right because
the first amendment guarantees the public access to the information
made public at an open court hearing, not physical access to the
items themselves. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608 (no first amendment right
to physically access and copy tapes admitted into evidence at open
trial); United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 408 (6th Cir. 1986)
(same); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 424 (5th
Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 105 (8th
Cir. 1986) (same); State ex rel. KOIN-TV, 711 P.2d at 977 (same);
Valley Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986)
(no first amendment

right to access and copy, during trial,

photographs admitted into evidence); United States v. Thomas, 745
F.Supp. 499 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (no first amendment right to copy
videotape admitted into evidence at open suppression hearing);
People v. Glogowski, 135 Misc.2d 950, 517 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Cty. Ct.
1987) (same), aff'd , 565 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1990); see. also United
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d

814, 817

(3rd Cir. 1981) (media

appellants concede there is no constitutional right to copy audio
and videotapes admitted at trial).
Although the cases cited by the media might be persuasive on a
narrowly framed issue involving a specific request for access to
specific evidentiary items introduced at the preliminary hearing in
this case, they do not support the oversimplistically broad claim
made here.20

The Seventh Circuit has recognized a first amendment

20

The media's brief is not clear or consistent about whether
their arguments in Part II are addressed to all exhibits admitted
in open court or just to some unspecified "documentary exhibits."
45

presumptive right of public access to inspect judicial records,
including exhibits admitted at a criminal trial, United States v.
Peters, 754 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1985), and to a litigation report
admitted into evidence in open court at a hearing on a dispositive
motion

to

terminate

a

shareholders' derivative

suit,

In re

Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir.
1984).

United

States District

Judge Spellman has

summarily

concluded there is a first amendment and common law right of access
to a videotape admitted into evidence and played in open court at
a pretrial bond hearing, as well as to documents (tax returns)
admitted into evidence at a criminal trial.

United States v.

Saunders, 611 F. Supp. 45 (D.C. Fla. 1985) (videotape); United
States v. Posner, 594 F. Supp. 930 (D.C. Fla. 1984).

Even Judge

Spellman declined to hold that the press's first amendment right of
"access" to the documentary evidence includes a right to copy it.
Posner, 594 F. Supp. at 935.21

Another federal district judge has

held that there is a first amendment right of public access to an
The media have not sought "access" to the transcribed police
interviews with defendants, which were admitted into evidence but
not read into evidence at the preliminary hearing here. "Access"
by the public to the information contained in those interviews may
be protected by the first amendment as part of its constitutional
right to attend a preliminary hearing, a right already recognized
in Press Enterprise II and Kearns-Tribune.
See, e.g., United
States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (E.D. N.Y. 1981)
(audiotape admitted into evidence, but not read into record, at
sentencing hearing); State v. Anonymous, 40 Conn. Super. 38, 479
A.2d 1244 (1984) (written statement admitted, but not read into
record, at suppression hearing).
21

Contrary to the media's erroneous citation on page 37 of its
brief, Judge Spellman's ruling in Posner has never been affirmed by
a higher court. The citation given is to an Eleventh Circuit
decision in a related appeal that does not involve access issues.
46

audiotape admitted into evidence at an open sentencing hearing,
United States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (E.D. N.Y.
1981), but this ruling did not address the question of copying.
Thus, the only cited case that finds a first amendment right to
inspect and copy evidence, a videotape, admitted at a pretrial
proceeding in a criminal case, Saunders, is directly contrary to
the first amendment holdings in Nixon and other cases cited above.
Whatever first amendment right there may be to inspect or copy
trial exhibits, there are several obvious and compelling policy
reasons not to throw open the doors of the trial court's exhibit
room to the public before a criminal prosecution is complete. The
physical

integrity

of

original

documents

and

nondocumentary

exhibits (bloody levis, fingerprint impressions, tissue samples)
must be preserved for trial through restricted access to exhibits,
see Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-206, and the chain of custody of evidence
to be used at trial must be documented.

Some exhibits may be

physically admitted in their entirety, but only portions admitted
as evidence relevant to the issues at a preliminary hearing.

In

addition, evidence admitted at preliminary hearings in Utah, which
is not

necessarily

legally

admissible

at

trial

(involuntary

statements of defendant, gruesome photographs of victim), may be
prejudicial to sixth amendment rights. Yet a presumptive right of
public access to exhibits at the preliminary hearing phase would
seem to preclude categorical sealing of such exhibits in all cases
until defendants had evaluated the effects of release on their
ability to obtain a fair trial. Finally, the administrative burden
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placed on each court to police public access to the exhibit room
and oversee the copying of exhibits outside the courthouse far
outweighs any benefits to be gained by a physical inspection of
exhibits that the public is already entitled to see or hear in an
open court proceeding.

The State therefore urges this Court to

reject the sweeping constitutional claim asserted by the media on
appeal

with

regard

to

physical

access

to, and

copying

of,

evidentiary exhibits.
VI. THERE IS NO COMMON LAW RIGHT IN UTAH OF PUBLIC ACCESS, FOR
INSPECTION AND COPYING BEFORE TRIAL, TO ANY EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING. ANY COMMON LAW RIGHT OF THE
PUBLIC TO INSPECT AND COPY ANY EXHIBIT MADE PART OF THE JUDICIAL
RECORD BY BEING ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE IN OPEN COURT HAS BEEN
OBVIATED BY PREEMPTIVE STATE STATUTES REGULATING PUBLIC ACCESS TO
PUBLIC DATA, INCLUDING JUDICIAL RECORDS.
The media invite this Court to adopt as part of Utah's common
law the federal common law right to inspect and copy evidence
admitted in open court as a public, judicial document. All but one
of the federal cases relied on by the media concern access during
or after trial to exhibits previously admitted at trial.22

The

facts of the instant case, however, only present the issue of
physical access, for inspection and copying before a criminal
trial, to exhibits introduced at a preliminary hearing.
The media has made no effort to show what the relevant

22

The exception, United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), recognized a federal common law right of public access
to documents seized by the government from the Church of
Scientology and introduced into evidence at a suppression hearing
that was part of the criminal prosecution of church leaders. The
court nonetheless denied public access to the documents because of
the threat to privacy interests of the nondefendant church and
individuals.
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common law rule was at the time of Utah statehood and has not
provided any reasoned basis for why this Court should adopt any
part of the common law rule that has developed in federal courts
since then.
provide

The broad right asserted by the media here would

the public physical

access to, and

copying

of, any

evidentiary exhibit admitted at a preliminary hearing or any open
court proceeding, a right that would be only surplusage to the
public's constitutional right to the information available from
attending the court proceeding itself.

See note 20, supra.

The

absence of any history of unrestricted public access in Utah to
exhibits, as well as the common sense reasons noted above for not
giving the public carte blanche access to a court's exhibit room,
strongly counsel against recognition of such a broad common law
right.
In any event, the common law has been obviated as a source of
any access right in Utah to evidentiary exhibits as part of a
judicial record. As previously discussed under Point III, the Utah
Legislature has comprehensively regulated the area of access to,
and copying of public records, including judicial records, thereby
occupying the field.

Because the access sought by the media is

controlled by statute, there is no reason for this Court to rule on
the common law issue.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah requests that this
Court affirm the September 27, 1990, final order of Judges Park and
Ballif.
Respectfully submitted this 3/uCday of Augustv 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Utah Attorney General
ANNINA M. MITCHELL (2274)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the foregoing
Response Brief of Appellee State of Utah to be hand-delivered, this
3A<CL

day

of

August,

1992,

to

the

following

attorneys

appellants:
Kathryn Snedaker
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
l.L4L*s^*^

50

X^t (L<mJLdzXuUiJf

for

